So held the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in a recent reserved judgment, allowing an interlocutory appeal by the Crown against the refusal by Mr Justice Calvert-Smith at the Central Criminal Court on March 11, 2009, of its application under s.44 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for an order that the trial of John Twomey, Peter Blake, Glen Cameron and Barry Hibberd, be conducted without a jury because of the danger of jury tampering. They have been charged with possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, possession of a firearm with intent to commit robbery, robbery and conspiracy to rob, at the Menzies World Cargo warehouse, Heathrow, in 2004,

The Lord Chief Justice, giving the judgment of the court, said that “in this country trial by jury is a hallowed principle of the administration of criminal justice. It is properly identified as a right, available to be exercised by a defendant unless and until the right is amended or circumscribed by express legislation”. But he added that the constitutional responsibilities of the jury are flouted if the integrity of an individual juror, and thus of the jury as a whole, is compromised. Any attempt at interference with the jury constitutes an abuse or misuse of the process. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 has imposed fresh restrictions on the right to trial by jury, identifying two particular situations in which such a trial on indictment may be conducted not by a judge and jury, but by a judge sitting alone. These are:-

s.44 (4) The first condition is that there is evidence of a real and present danger that jury tampering would take place.
(5) The second condition is that, notwithstanding any steps (including the provision of police protection) which might reasonably be taken to prevent jury tampering, the likelihood that it would take place would be so substantial as to make it necessary in the interests of justice for the trial to be conducted without a jury.

The Lord Chief Justice said that the legislation is unequivocal and unambiguous and the judge is required to make the order if the conditions in s.44(4) and (5) are fulfilled. After reviewing and considering the history of the case to date, he concluded that “the first pre-condition to the order sought by the prosecution is emphatically established. By that we mean that the danger of jury tampering and the subversion of the process of trial by jury is very significant”. The estimated cost of protective measures was estimated to be £1.5 million, with the loss of 32 police officers from their other duties for six months or longer. “But in our judgment these protective measures do not sufficiently address the extent of the risk…Even if it did deal with the dangers posed to the integrity of trial by jury, it would be unreasonable to impose that package with its drain on financial resources and police manpower on the police, and, no less important, it would be totally unfair to impose the additional burdens consequent on the deployment of this package on individual jurors”.

The full text of the judgement, Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWCA Crim 1035, Case No: 2009/01566, b e f o r e the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Justice Goldring and Mr Justice McCombe, can be found at:-

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/1035.html

This week the headache became a full blown migraine for the Government when plans to give police up to 42 days to question terrorism suspects were crushed by the House of Lords. Peers voted against the measure by 309 votes to 118. This came after opposition to the proposals from all sides, with 24 Labour rebels including two former Lord Chancellors, Lord Irvine and Lord Falconer, as well as Baroness Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5, Lord Justice Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, and Lord Condon, the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner.

In an emergency statement to MPs, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith conceded defeat and said that the Counter-Terrorism Bill would continue its journey through Parliament without the 42 day measure. According to the ‘Guardian’, Government sources said the Prime Minister’s hand was forced because whips in the Commons told Downing Street that they would struggle to muster a majority in favour of the proposal. The 42 day plan was only passed by MPs in June by nine votes after the Prime Minister won the support of the nine Democratic Unionist MPs. If ministers had insisted on keeping the 42 day plan there would have been the need for a series of votes in the Commons to overturn the Lords’ rejection and eventually the use of the Parliament Act to force the bill through next year.

The capitulation was defiantly unrepentent. In her Commons statement, the Home Secretary was positively reproachful. She said “The other place has tonight voted to remove from the Counter-Terrorism Bill the protections that the government believes should be in place. Not to amend; not to strengthen; simply to remove. Mr Speaker, my priority remains the protection of the British people. I do not believe, as some hon. members clearly do, that it is enough to simply cross our fingers and hope for the best …that is not good enough. Because when it comes to national security, there are certain risks I’m not prepared to take.”

In what some see as a face saving gesture, the Home Secretary announced that she had “prepared a new bill to enable the police and prosecutors to do their work – should the worst happen, should a terrorist plot overtake us and threaten our current investigatory capabilities… The Counter Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill now stands ready to be introduced if and when the need arises. This would enable the Director of Public Prosecutions to apply to the courts to detain and question a terrorist suspect for up to a maximum of 42 days. Individuals could only be detained where this is authorised by a judge.” Once again the totemic 42 days.

The climb down has pleased a wide diversity of groups, and it is reported that David Davies, who resigned his seat and fought a by-election over this issue, shared a celebratory bottle of champagne in the Commons with Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty.

Even the England cricket team now has a South African skipper. Michael Vaughan may have made a lachrymose departure but the last time England had a South African skipper it also ended in tears when Tony Greig fell for Kerry Packer’s wealth and took half the test side with him to World Cricket. Kevin Pieterson has made no secret of his determination to dip his bread in the IPL 20/20 riches, so perhaps history will repeat itself.

And so to the Judiciary. The appropriately named Sir Igor Judge will become Lord Chief Justice when Lord Phillips stands down in October. Sir Igor was born in Malta. Truly Britain is a land of opportunity.

According to Clare Dyer, legal editor of the “Guardian”, the move has been pushed through by the lord chief justice, Lord Phillips, “who has long believed that judges’ fusty headgear and antiquated garments should be consigned to the dressing-up box. He and his recent predecessors have argued that the outdated apparel contributes to public attitudes that the judges are out of touch with ordinary life. But he failed to convince judges hearing criminal cases, who claim that wigs add to the dignity of proceedings and confer an anonymity which stops villains recognising them out of court.” Wigs will continue to be worn by high court judges and circuit judges presiding over criminal cases. Circuit judges will lose their wigs for civil cases but will retain their current gown and tippet rather than moving to the new robe.

When he decided to simplify judges’ garb, the lord chief justice expected barristers to follow suit. But the profession has been fighting to retain its traditional wig and gown. The Bar Council has twice consulted with its grassroots and has still not announced whether it intends to come into line with the judges. The consultation has revealed that well over half want to keep their traditional dress for cases in the House of Lords, court of appeal and high court.

Judges in the House of Lords may adopt a simple black gown when it becomes the supreme court in October 2009.