Black people are 26 times more likely than white people to be stopped and searched by police in England and Wales. The figures relate to stop and searches under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which was introduced to deal with football hooligans and the threat of serious violence. It allows police to search anyone in a designated area without specific grounds for suspicion.

As reported in the ‘Observer’, analysis by the London School of Economics and the Open Society Justice Initiative found that there are 41.6 Section 60 searches for every 1,000 black people, compared with 1.6 for every 1,000 white people, making black people 26.6 times more likely to be stopped and searched. Asians were 6.3 times more likely to be stopped than whites, according to the analysis of Ministry of Justice figures for 2008-09. This analysis of government data has brought claims of discrimination from campaigners who say the findings corroborate concerns that black and Asian Britons are being unfairly targeted. The data reveal a marked escalation in relative searches of ethnic minorities in England and Wales. In the previous year blacks were 10.7 times more likely to be stopped than whites, and Asians 2.2 times more likely. US civil rights activist Jesse Jackson, recently arrived in London to launch a campaign aimed at curbing what he says is stop and search discrimination, described the figures as “astonishing”. Interviewed on ‘Newsnight’ on Monday, he said that this race profiling, indicative of basic structural inequalities, produced a “racial dragnet that is immoral and illegal.” Not the least effect, he said, is that it deprives the police of their moral authority and credibility.

In July, Home Secretary Theresa May told Parliament that the government would change how stop and search powers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act are used with immediate effect. The move was in response to a decision by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that the use of stop and search powers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 amounted to a violation of the right to a private life. The court said the powers were drawn too broadly at the time of their initial authorisation and did not have enough safeguards to protect civil liberties. However, the police can still rely on powers granted by section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which allows police to stop individuals without reasonable suspicion “in anticipation of violence,” and by schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which allows stops in ports and airports for counterterrorism purposes.  Police use of these powers has given rise to similar problems as seen with section 44, with a disproportionate impact on ethnic minorities.
 
The National Council for Civil Liberties, now known simply as Liberty, report that a consultation on amending PACE Codes, not published on the Home Office website but only made available to certain interested organisations, includes a statement that whilst officers must take particular care not to discriminate, there “may be circumstances…where it is appropriate for officers to take account of an individual’s ethnic origin in selecting persons and vehicles to be stopped.” Isabella Sankey, Director of Policy for Liberty, said: “Stopping and searching individuals without suspicion is divisive enough without telling police they can directly discriminate on the grounds of race. Significant progress has been made since the Lawrence Inquiry but the Home Office’s planned changes to PACE will set the clock back and jeopardise race relations in the UK.”

Yesterday Home Secretary Theresa May told Parliament that a rapid review of key counter-terrorism and security powers is underway. The review, a commitment in the coalition agreement, published on 20 May 2010, will look at what counter-terrorism powers and measures could be rolled back in order to restore the balance of civil liberties and counter-terrorism powers “and, in so doing, restore the ancient civil liberties that should be synonymous with the name of our country.”

She said: “The review will consider six key powers: control orders; section 44 stop-and-search powers and the use of terrorism legislation in relation to photography; the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by local authorities and access to communications data more generally; extending the use of deportations with assurances in a manner that is consistent with our legal and human rights obligations; measures to deal with organisations that promote hatred or violence; and the detention of terrorist suspects before charge.” She believes that these are the most controversial and sensitive powers. “In particular, the issue of pre-charge detention has been the subject of considerable debate in the House, and tomorrow we will consider whether to renew the current detention limit for a further six months.” That would provide sufficient time to look carefully at pre-charge detention and to explore how the period of detention below 28 days can be reduced. She added: “Personally, I was always in favour of 14 days, but the whole point of a review is to look at what the appropriate period should be, and I do not wish to pre-empt the review’s decision or the information with which it will come forward.”

The review will be conducted by the Home Office with the full involvement of the police, security and intelligence agencies and other Government Departments, including those in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and with oversight from Lord Ken Macdonald QC, former Director of Public Prosecutions. The proposals made by Lord Carlile, in his statutory role as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, will be fully considered as part of the review. The Home Secretary concluded: “I want the review to be conducted as openly and transparently as possible. I have asked Liberty to contribute to the review, and it has said that it would be delighted to do so. I am keen to involve other civil liberty and community organisations and, as with other reviews, I would urge anyone with an interest to submit their views to the Home Office.” On timing, she said: “I have ordered that the review should be completed as quickly as possible, because it is important that the police and the security and intelligence agencies are able to do their vital work with certainty and confidence. I will report back to Parliament on the outcome of the review after the summer recess.”

The blog posted on 23 June 2009 concerned the annual report by Lord Carlile, the government’s official anti-terror law watchdog, about the use of s.44 Terrorism Act 2000, which grants police the power to stop and search anyone in a designated area without suspicion that an offence has occurred. He found that examples of poor or unnecessary use of the section abound. “I have evidence of cases where the person stopped is so obviously far from any known terrorism profile that, realistically, there is not the slightest possibility of him/her being a terrorist” he said. He added that terrorism related powers should be used only for terrorism related purposes, otherwise their credibility is severely damaged.

Another blog, posted on 27 January this year, reported the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that police stop and search powers under anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom are too wide and not adequately safeguarded by the law against abuse. The Court concluded that the powers of authorisation and confirmation, as well as those of stop and search under ss. 44 and 45, were neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse. They were not, therefore, “in accordance with the law”, in violation of Article 8.

Now comes another embarrassment for the police service with the revelation that tens of thousands of people have been stopped in the street and searched unlawfully, and it could be that they are all entitled to compensation. Fourteen police forces are urgently trying to find the individuals involved after being told by the Home Office that errors had been found in the way 40 separate stop and search operations were authorised since the powers were introduced in 2001. The Home Office said that in most of the cases authorisations were issued for periods beyond the 28-day statutory limit for each operation or were not signed off by ministers within the statutory 48-hour deadline. The Met and City of London police were responsible for 10 of the 40 illegal operations. Thames Valley police were responsible for six, Sussex five and Greater Manchester three.

Nick Herbert, the police minister, said in a written Commons statement on 10 June that the mistake was discovered after a freedom of information request triggered a review of the Metropolitan police’s s. 44 records, which in turn led to a comprehensive review by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. He said: “To summarise these errors, on 33 occasions authorisations were specified to be for 29 days, and two occasions when the authorisations were specified to be for 30 days, whereas the statutory maximum period is 28 days. In addition, there was one further case…where ministerial confirmation for the authorisation was not provided within the statutory 48 hour deadline”. Four other cases were mentioned. He concluded: “I am aware that there is considerable concern about the operation of section 44 stop-and-search powers going beyond these authorisation errors. The Government are committed to a wider review of counter-terrorism legislation, including the operation of the section 44 stop-and-search provisions.”

The latest Home Office statistics show that there were 148,798 stop and searches under section 44 in 2009, 40 % fewer than the previous year.  A total of 688 arrests were made as a result of these searches, an arrest rate of 0.5%.

Police stop and search powers under anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom are too wide and not adequately safeguarded by the law against abuse. So held the European Court of Human Rights in a recent judgment. The case concerned the police power in the United Kingdom under sections 44-47 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and search individuals without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. These sections came into force on 19 February 2001.

The applicants in this case, Kevin Gillan and Pennie Quinton, are British nationals. On 9 September 2003 they were both stopped and searched by the police, acting under sections 44-47 of the 2000 Act, while on their way to a demonstration close to an arms fair held in the Docklands area of East London. Mr Gillan was riding a bicycle and carrying a rucksack when stopped and searched by two police officers. Ms Quinton, a journalist, was stopped and searched by a police officer and ordered to stop filming in spite of the fact that she showed her press cards. The applicants applied for judicial review. On 31 October 2003 the High Court dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal, on 29 July 2004, made no order on the applicants’ claims against the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and dismissed the claim against the Secretary of State. On 8 March 2006 the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the applicants’ appeals. In particular, the Law Lords were doubtful whether an ordinary superficial search of the person could be said to show a lack of respect for private life, so as to bring Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights into operation. Even if Article 8 did apply, the procedure was in accordance with the law and it would be impossible to regard a proper exercise of the power as other than proportionate when seeking to counter the great danger of terrorism. In their appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants complained that the use of the section 44 power to stop and search each of them breached their rights under Articles 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association).

In its unanimous decision, the Court considered that the use of the coercive powers conferred by the anti-terrorism legislation to require an individual to submit to a detailed search of their person, clothing and personal belongings amounted to a clear interference with the right to respect for private life. The public nature of the search, with the discomfort of having personal information exposed to public view, might even in certain cases compound the seriousness of the interference because of an element of humiliation and embarrassment. The interference could not be compared to searches of travellers at airports. An air traveller may be seen as consenting to such a search by choosing to travel. In the Court’s view, the wide discretion conferred on the police under the 2000 Act, both in terms of the authorisation of the power to stop and search and its application in practice, had not been curbed by adequate legal safeguards so as to offer the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference. The Court was struck by the statistical and other evidence showing the extent to which police officers resorted to the powers of stop and search under section 44 of the Act – between 2004 and 2008 the total of searches recorded by the Ministry of Justice went from 33,177 to 117,278 – and found that there was a clear risk of arbitrariness in granting such broad discretion to the police officer. While the present case did not concern black applicants or those of Asian origin, the risks of the discriminatory use of the powers against such persons was a very real consideration and the statistics showed that black and Asian persons were disproportionately affected by the powers. There was, furthermore, a risk that such a widely framed power could be misused against demonstrators and protestors in breach of Article 10 and/or 11 of the Convention.

In conclusion, the Court considered that the powers of authorisation and confirmation as well as those of stop and search under sections 44 and 45 of the 2000 Act were neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse. They were not, therefore, “in accordance with the law”, in violation of Article 8. Given this finding, the Court held that it was not necessary to examine the applicants’ complaints under Articles 5, 10 and 11. The Court held that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. They were awarded 33,850 euros for costs and expenses.

European Court of Human Rights; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom (application no. 4158/05). Judgment delivered on 12.01 2010, published 15.01.2010.